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INTRODUCTION 1. 
Consider a defence planner who 
must determine how much of a 
particular nature of ammunition to 
purchase over the immediate short 
term. There are two critical factors 
which affect this decision. The ﬁ  rst is 
that suppliers typically have long lead 
times. For example, the lead time for 
some Canadian Forces (CF) natures 
(“nature” means a speciﬁ   c type of 
ammunition) produced domestically 
is about two years. The second is that 
there is signiﬁ  cant usage uncertainty. 
That is, there is signiﬁ  cant year-to-
year variation in usage. These two 
factors put a premium on careful 
planning to make sure that there are 
no shortages and, at the same time, 
that inventories are not excessively 
high. This paper presents a model for 
determining order sizes which trade-
off these competing objectives.
Materials Requirements/
Resource Planning (MRP) and its 
successor, Enterprise Resource 
Management (ERP), are well 
developed technologies (particularly 
in the private sector) for matching 
manufacturing requirements and 
manufacturing schedules with ﬁ  nal 
product demand requirements. 
However, these systems are only 
as good as the models underneath 
that inform them. For good models, 
we need to turn to the operational 
research literature on inventory 
management. The seminal reference 
is Petersen and Silver [1].
Most texts in management 
science and operations management 
devote whole chapters to techniques 
for efﬁ   cient purchasing decisions. 
Examples are Anderson et al [2], 
Chase et al [3], and Nahmias [4]. That 
I am aware, there are few models 
which capture the essentials of the 
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uncertainty, planningammunition inventory problem I will 
describe below. Consequently, my 
purpose is to develop a simple model 
of ammunition purchase and inventory 
in the case where there is signiﬁ  cant 
ammunition usage uncertainty and 
long lead times for purchase. 
2. THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
PROBLEM
Most defence organizations 
purchase two kinds of rounds. One is 
used only in operations (stockpiles); 
the other is used in training. In this 
paper we focus on the purchase of 
training rounds since the problem 
of determining stockpiles is subject 
to a different set of performance 
characteristics. With stockpiles, the 
costs of running out of ammunition are 
signiﬁ  cantly higher. In addition, training 
round inventories tend to be a much 
larger investment than stockpiles.
What is critical to this analysis 
is an understanding of the way 
ammunition supply and use are 
organized. For the CF, those who use 
the ammunition – the trainers – are 
a different part of the organization 
than those who are responsible for 
the purchase of ammunition. The 
ammunition requirement for training 
purposes is forecast at best a year 
in advance. Very often training 
schedules are not ﬁ  nalized  until 
the very last moment. Moreover, 
the forecast of the ammunition 
requirement for individual courses 
is usually quite different than what is 
actually used for a variety of reasons. 
Very often, the actual number of 
soldiers taking a course is different 
than what was forecast, and, over the 
course, soldiers can fail the course 
before  ﬁ   nishing it, thus reducing 
the ammunition required over the 
remainder of the course. All this 
to say, the CF has a difﬁ  cult time 
estimating the ammunition for a 
single course and, what is more, there 
is substantial evidence that there is a 
systematic error in this estimate. For 
example, the forecast of the annual 
Army training requirement measured 
in dollars is usually substantially 
above what is actually used. In 
some years, the error is of the order 
of 30%. Sufﬁ   ce it to say, that a 
forecast of the requirement based on 
training plans is not reliable. Beyond 
that, training plans are forecast, at 
best, a year in advance which is a 
shorter time-frame than the lead-
time for purchase. All this to say, 
in the absence of information to 
the contrary, the best predictor of a 
nature’s requirement is past usage 
aggregated over all training courses. 
As it turns out, these usages have been 
fairly constant for most natures. The 
only time this would change would 
be where there is a material change to 
the force structure. For instance, if the 
Government of Canada approved an 
investment in a new infantry battalion, 
the training requirement for infantry 
natures would change substantially.
2.1. An Example
Suppose that aggregate usage of a 
particular nature over the past six years 
is as shown in the following table:
Table no.1. 
Aggregate usage over 6 yearsAt a later point in the paper, we 
will discuss the implications if these 
assumptions are relaxed.
To get estimates for the parameters 
of the normal distribution, we could 
use standard maximum likelihood 
estimators (MLEs). In the general 
case, suppose that the history of 
usages over the past m years is
                                                       (1)
                                                       
Then the MLE for the mean is the 
sample average
                                   (2)
and for the standard deviation, it is 
the sample standard deviation:
                                                       (3)
 For the dataset above,
_
u = 10, 197                                    (4)
s = 755.                                          (5)
Returning to our example, let 
I0 = 3, 650 be the current inventory, 
let x1 = 10, 000 be the amount to be 
delivered at the start of year y1, let x2 = 
11, 000 be the amount to be delivered 
at the start of year y2, and let x3 be 
the amount which is to be ordered 
for delivery at the start of year y3. 
It is x3 that the planner is trying to 
determine. Let Ui be the uncertain 
usage in year yi for i = 1, 2, and 3. For 
year y3, we would like the inventory 
at the start of the year (including the 
order amount x3) to be sufﬁ  cient so 
that there are no shortages. That is, 
we would like
In this table we use y−1 to refer to 
last year, y−2 for the year previous to 
that, and so on. Clearly these usages 
are variable and the planner must take 
this into account when determining 
how much to order. Suppose that the 
planner is looking forward in time 
and it is late in year y−1. His current 
inventory is 3,650 units, 10,000 units 
are due to be delivered at the start of 
year y1, and 11,000 units are due to 
be delivered at the start of year y2. The 
planner must decide how much to order 
now for delivery at the start of year 
y3. Moreover he would like to do this 
in such a way that there is a very low 
probability of a shortage in year y3.
The  ﬁ  rst step is to characterize 
usage over years y1, y2, and y3. With so 
little historical data, it is difﬁ  cult to say 
what sort of probability distribution 
the usages are drawn from. However, 
on theoretical grounds, one could 
argue that the normal distribution 
is appropriate. The annual usage 
of a particular nature is the sum of 
a number of uncertain demands 
including individual training serials, 
collective training exercises, and 
other uses. Hence the Central Limit 
Theorem suggests that the annual 
usage, a sum of random in-year 
usages, ought to follow a normal 
distribution. Consequently we begin 
with the assumption that annual usage 
is drawn from a normal distribution 
with mean μ and standard deviation σ. 
In addition we assume that:
1. the distribution of year-to-year 
usages is stationary (each year’s 
usage is drawn from the same normal 
distribution); and 
2. the sequence of annual usages 
are independent random variables.Pr(U1 + U2 + U3 ≤ I0 + x1 + x2 + x3)    (6)
to be quite high. Note that the 
left-hand side of the inequality is the 
aggregate use over the years y1, y2, 
and y3; the right-hand side is what is 
available to use over this same period. 
Since Ui is a normal random variable 
for all i, U1 + U2 + U3 is also normally 
distributed. The mean of this sum is 
3μ and the standard deviation is √3σ. 
Using the MLEs derived above, we 
estimate that U1 + U2 + U3 follows a 
normal distribution with mean
  _
3u = 30, 590                                  (7)
and standard deviation
√3s = 1, 307.                                  (8)
Hence if I0+x1+x2+x3 is set at 1.645 
standard deviations above the mean, 
30,590, there is only a 5% chance of 
running out of ammunition. More 
generally,
I0+x1+x2+x3 = 3u + 1.645√3s         (9)
implying that
x3 = 3u + 1.645√3s − I0 − x1 − x2.      (10)
Substituting the numbers from 
our example, we have
x3 = 30, 590 + 1.645(1, 307) − 3, 650 − 10, 000 − 
11, 000 = 8, 090 rounds.                       (11)
Consequently, the planner should 
order approximately 8,100 rounds 
for delivery at the start of year y3. 
At this order level there is about a 
5% chance of running out in year y3. 
Obviously a number of reﬁ  nements 
are possible. Here are just a few:
1. The planner may be 
uncomfortable giving the same weigh 
to each usage in the data history. 
An obvious adjustment would be 
put more weight on the most recent 
observations. This is easily done 
using weighted sample estimators.
2. The planner may feel that the 
stationarity assumption on average usage 
is unwarranted. It is straightforward to 
adjust the model for drift upward or 
downward in the average usage.
3. The planner may feel that the 
usages in forward periods might be 
more (or less) variable than the usage 
history suggests. This is easily handled 
by allowing the planner to adjust the 
estimate of standard deviation.
4. The decision timings are likely 
to be slightly different than those we 
have modeled here. For instance it 
might be that the planner is trying 
to make a decision, say, half way 
through year y−1 for what to order 
for delivery at the start of year y3. 
The analysis for this case follows the 
same principles. We will have more 
to say about this below.
The planner may wish to alter 
the risk of stock-out depending on 
the nature he is considering. For 
instance, for the data above, suppose 
the planner wanted the probability of 
running out to be less than 1% rather 
than 5%. Then he would allow for 3 
standard deviations above the mean:
x3 = 3u + 3√3s − I0 − x1 − x2
   = 30, 590 + 3(1, 307) − 3, 650 − 10, 000 − 11, 000
   = 9, 862 rounds                        (12)
With 3 standard deviations there is 
a less than a 1% chance of running where k is an opportunity cost of 
capital. The left-hand side is the 
present value of the payment for the 
volume purchase; the right-hand side 
is the present value of two purchases, 
one at the start of year y3 and the 
second at the start of year y4. This 
inequality simpliﬁ  es to the condition
         
                                                     (14)
That is, the discount must exceed 
an adjusted purchase requirement 
fraction.
Here is an example. Suppose we 
take k to be 12% based on an assessment 
of the current government borrowing 
rate adjusted for risk and inventory 
costs. In addition, suppose that
                         (15)
Then we must have that
                                                     (16)
That is, the price discount must be 
at least 5.4% for the volume purchase 
to be economic.
4. THE VALUE 
OF INFORMATION
The decision about how much 
to buy for year y3 depends critically 
on the quality of the information the 
planner has. For instance it would be 
preferable to make a decision some 
time early in year y1 rather than y−1 
since the planner is likely to have 
better information about u−1 and I0. 
out. The model is easily adjusted for 
this requirement. Note that moving 
to a 1% stockout risk increases the 
purchase quantity substantially. Our 
view is that 5% ought to be reasonable 
for most natures.
6. Other distributional assumptions 
are possible. Here we employed the 
normal distribution for good reasons. 
But a planner may prefer a distribution 
which ascribes higher variation such 
as the uniform distribution. Again, it 
is straightforward to make this kind 
of adjustment.
3. ASSESSING VOLUME 
DISCOUNTS
Very often, ammunition suppliers 
are prepared to offer price discounts 
if defence organizations are prepared 
to take delivery of a higher volume. 
Returning to our CF example, suppose 
a supplier is currently charging a price 
of p per unit for those units delivered 
in at the beginning of year y3 but if 
the CF is prepared to purchase its y3 
and y4 requirements at the beginning 
of year y3, the all-units price is p(1−δ) 
where δ > 0. The question is whether 
it is economic to make the higher 
volume purchase.
Taking the approach outlined 
above, suppose an analyst determines 
that the y3 and y4 requirements are 
x3 and x4 respectively. Then it will 
be cheaper to purchase all of this 
requirement at the beginning of year 
y3 if   
                                               (13)Having u−1 rather than an estimate 
means that his parameter estimates 
for the usage distribution will be 
more accurate. For the same reason, 
waiting to the end of the year to 
observe I0 is preferable to estimating 
it at some point in year y−1. All 
things being equal, both of these 
factors allow the planner to order a 
smaller amount for a given level of 
stock-out risk. Hence, it is best to 
delay the purchase decision if such 
a delay allows the planner access to 
better data.
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